A framework is presented to evaluate the safety and availability of the railway operation, and quantifying the probability of the signalling system not to supervise the railway traffic. Since a failure of the signalling systems still allows operation of the railway, it is not sufficient to study their effect on the railway operation by considering only the failures and delays. The safety and availability are evaluated, handling both repairs and replacements by using a Markov model. The model is verified with a case study of Swedish railway signalling systems with different scenarios. The results show that the probability of being in a state where operation is possible in a degraded mode is greater than the probability of not being operative at all, which reduces delays but requires other risk mitigation measures to ensure safe operation. The effects that different improvements can have on the safety and availability of the railway operation are simulated. The results show that combining maintenance improvements to reduce the failure rate and increase the repair rate is more efficient at increasing the probability of being in an operative state and reducing the probability of operating in a degraded state.
Introduction
The railway signalling system protects, controls and supervises the railway traffic, in order to ensure safe operation. The signalling system supervises the railway at all times, not only when a train passes, which makes it a continuously operating system. Hence, all maintenance time will affect the operation of the signalling system.
Signalling systems are an example of large complex systems made of multiple hierarchical layers and indenture levels, 1 and with a long expected useful life (in general, between 30 and 40 years). The performance evaluation of complex systems has its own challenges, i.e. the lack of the system overview and the conflicting objectives or unclear distribution of responsibilities between the actors involved (e.g. the manufacturer, operator, maintainer, etc.). 1 The long useful life of the system implicates that the process and procedures to record the failures could be modified during the time, showing inconsistencies or having incomplete data. 2, 3 It can also be affected on changes of the provider of the components, design updates, changes of maintenance procedures, etc. Furthermore, data sets are collected for maintenance management rather than reliability engineers; hence they may lack vital information for a proper reliability evaluation, which can lead to wrong or incomplete conclusions. 2 The standard EN 50126 4 defines the terms of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) as follows:
1. Reliability is the probability that an item can perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval. 2. Availability is the ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval assuming that the required external resources are provided. 3. Maintainability is the probability that a given active maintenance action, for an item under given conditions of use, can be carried out within a stated time interval when the maintenance is performed under stated conditions and using stated procedures and resources. 4. Safety is the freedom from an unacceptable risk of harm.
The RAMS of a railway system is influenced in three ways: by sources of failure introduced internally within the system at any phase of the system life cycle (system conditions), by external sources of failure on the system during operation (operating conditions) and by external sources of failure on the system during maintenance activities (maintenance conditions). 4 These sources of failure can interact, and can affect greatly the operating performance of the railway systems, explaining the large discrepancies observed between intrinsic and effective reliability of existing systems. [1] [2] [3] [4] To operate on a specific railway corridor (RC), the signalling systems of train and infrastructure must be interoperable. In Sweden, state companies such Transitio or Rikstrafiken (via ASJ) provide the operators with the necessary rolling stock to solve this problem when necessary. 5 The main purpose of the railway signalling systems (which is, to ensure the safe operation of the railway) is fulfilled by the combination of the functionalities of all its parts, even though each part has its own particular goal and can be considered a complex system on its own.
When analysing the performance of a railway signalling system, to analyse the different parts independently would not give a full picture of the global performance, since the final purpose (to ensure the safe railway operation) depends on the relationship between them. Therefore, the railway signalling system can be considered as a system of systems (SoS), 6 and the interoperability between the different systems needs to be assured. Furthermore, the complex architecture of electronics and the interdependency between the components and systems make it difficult to identify and analyse anomalous behaviours. 7 In the case of signalling systems, this difficulty may be illustrated by the high number of no fault found events or not defined failures that are recorded. 8 The functionality of a railway signalling system is based on the principle of 'fail safe'; this means the railway section where a failure is located will not be fully operative, until the failure is repaired, to ensure safety. 4 Figure 1 describes the state transition diagram, showing an overview of the main states of the signalling system. 9 Since a failure of the signalling system still allows operation of the railway, albeit limited, it is not sufficient to study its effect on the railway operation in terms of reliability and safety by considering only the failures and delays. 10 Furthermore, the probability of being operative in a degraded mode is not easily measurable, since it is not directly linked to the number of failures and the delays.
A failure in a signalling system has economic consequences (penalties, high amount of maintenance resources, etc.), can affect the operation (delays, cancellations, speed restrictions, etc.) and have safety consequences. With a failed signalling system, a driver will operate in a degraded mode, with safety assured by other mitigation measures, such as low speed restrictions. The possibility of operating in a degraded mode reduces the economic and operational effects of a failure of the signalling systems, but makes it more difficult to evaluate the railway operation, since a failure will not necessarily be visible when considering the delays or cancelations, even though safety has been compromised. Within the maintenance area, the train records of the on-board part of the signalling system can help to identify a failure since they contain the information received from the infrastructure's part of the signalling system. Different approaches can be used to evaluate the safety and availability of railway signalling systems. As stated by Restel, 10 the classification into the subsets of availability and failure is not sufficient to model the reliability and safety of the railway system. There is a need for evaluating the safety and availability of the railway operation, and to quantify the probability of the signalling system not to supervise the railway traffic. This paper fulfils this need, by presenting a framework to evaluate the safety and availability of railway operation, focusing on the effects of railway signalling systems. Previous contributions focused on the evaluation of a particular subsystem. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] In contrast, this paper evaluates the whole signalling SoS. This is a good approach to use when it is not possible to determine the failed system or the specific failure mode. This paper is based on records from corrective maintenance showing the variance found in real data, which supports a check of the validity of the model for future implementation in industry. The safety and availability are evaluated during the maintenance and operation phases of the life cycle, handling both repairs and replacements of the different systems of the various subsystems of the SoS. The knowledge gained will facilitate the decision-making process when improving or updating the railway infrastructure.
This paper is structured as follows. 'Case study: The Swedish railway signalling SoS' section introduces the Swedish railway signalling. 'Model development for safety and availability evaluation of railway operation' section presents the developed methodology for safety and availability evaluation of the railway operation. 'Analysed scenarios and results' section presents the analysed scenarios and summarises the results obtained. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the results in 'Discussion' section and the conclusions in the final section.
Case study: The Swedish railway signalling SoS
The research is based on data obtained from the Swedish infrastructure manager (Trafikverket) for a fully operative RC where the automatic train control signalling system supervises and controls the network. The Swedish signalling SoS is composed of the following subsystems: 18 . Traffic management system (TMS): creates an interface between the traffic operator and the railway network. . Signals: give or restrict permission to the train on coming into a track section (TS It is possible to find other signalling systems (e.g. axle counters, automatic warning system, radio loop, etc.). However, these are not considered in this paper since they are not part of the Swedish signalling SoS and there is no corrective maintenance data for them. However, it would be possible to include them in the evaluation by making minor modifications in the model. A more accurate and complete description of the different signalling systems can be found in Theeg and Vlasenko. 19 In order to guarantee safe operation, the railway signalling divides the RC into TSs (or blocks) where only one train is allowed at a given time. 13 A TS is supervised by an interlocking located at the end of that section, usually at a station. Signals are placed at the entrance of every section and sometimes in the middle to allow or restrict the passing of a train into that section. Signals restrict the passing of a train when a failure occurs on a track circuit or an interlocking, and warns it to circulate with caution when there is a failure in a LC. When a signal fails, the BG associated with it will force the train to stop. If a balise does not work properly, it will produce an emergency brake. A single TMS controls the railway traffic of various corridors simultaneously. If the TMS fails, the operation has an automatic mode that allows normal operation for a maximum of 2 h. After that time, operation is not possible. If there is a stoppage of operation caused by a failure in the signalling system of a TS, railway operation can still be possible on that section if the dispatcher allows the driver to circulate with caution in a degraded operational mode. In this case, the maximum speed is 40 km/h and the driver's visual supervision is required to ensure safe circulation (e.g. there is no damage in the track; the switch is in the correct position, etc.). Summarising, from a reliability point of view, all the subsystems conforming the signalling SoS work in series to fulfil the main purpose of ensuring a safe railway operation. Since this paper focuses on the performance of the signalling SoS regarding the railway operation, it only considers those failure which will affect the performance (e.g. failures that occur in a system that is redundant and thereby continuous to fulfil its purpose are not considered).
Data collection
Corrective maintenance work orders (WOs) related to the railway infrastructure in Sweden are managed in a failure recording system called '0felia', while the data about the architecture of the whole railway infrastructure are managed by an asset register system (BIS). Both these databases were used as input for this paper.
The process of failure reporting is described in a document of the Swedish infrastructure manager. 20 The document lists the different steps and explains how to proceed from the time a failure is identified and reported until the corrective action is finished and the WO related to the failure is closed. Many actors are involved in the process, since the train operator can identify the failure, the railway infrastructure manager controls the activity performed on the railway network and a subcontracted company performs the corrective maintenance action. Since some parameters in 0felia are registered manually, processing the data is necessary to group information in an appropriate manner.
The corrective maintenance data cover WOs from January 2003 until November 2012 on a 203 km long RC, divided into 50 TSs and located in the northern part of Sweden. Specifically, 9030 WOs were registered during that period, of which 2455 were associated with signalling systems. No changes of configuration were made during the years included in the maintenance data used for this research on the RC considered. Hence, it can be assumed the WOs represent maintenance, not design changes or updates.
The data were processed to eliminate inconsistent or poor quality records. When studying the time to restore in the WOs, it was found that, of the 2456 WOs related to failures of signalling systems, 103 WOs had a restoration time of zero (0) seconds. Only 19 of these had a corrective action which could be used to calculate the restoration time, such as 'repair' (one WO), 'replacement' (10 WOs), 'restart' (three WOs) and 'removal of obstacles' (three WOs). It was decided not to consider these data, as their omission would not greatly affect the results of the analysis. The other abnormal result was that one WO had a negative time, probably due to an error when writing the 'correction action start date'.
Approximately 16% of the WOs have large times to restoration and maintain (more than one day). This can be due to different factors, e.g. the failure may not have affected the normal operation of the railway network and could wait for other scheduled maintenance, the complexity of the restoration may have been high, or it may have been difficult to identify where the failure was, etc. The procedures for corrective maintenance at Trafikverket state that a WO should be closed within a maximum of 24 h. 20 Hence, the WOs which were open for longer than 24 h were discarded. In addition, WOs were discarded if they did not correspond to any TS specified in the architecture database or were related to systems not specified for that TS. This left a total of 1933 WOs to be considered for further analysis.
Each TS has a different architecture composition for signalling systems. Two approaches can be used when evaluating the safety and availability of the railway operation, depending on the signalling system.
One approach is to consider that the goal is to identify the effects on the operation depending on the type of subsystem (e.g. IXL, LC, signal, etc.) and not focusing on which individual subsystem that is the cause when there is more than one within the studied TS. The other approach is to evaluate individually each subsystem and calculate the probability of affecting the operation for each one of them. Both approaches have been used in this paper; however, the results only show the first approach. This selection is due to two reasons. The first reason is that the goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects on the operation and not the particular performance of a subsystem. For that it is important to identify the type of subsystem that affects the operation. The second reason is that due to the particular data collection, it is not possible to identify in the WO which particular system is the one affected by a failure, only the TS where it is located.
The corrective maintenance data and architecture data were merged for the processing required before modelling. Only the failures affecting the operation are accounted for in this model. Hence, the TMS and the SBs are beyond the present scope: the TMS is shared by all TSs (even when the WOs are related to a particular section), while the SBs do not affect the operation of the railway.
From the case study's corrective maintenance data, it is possible to obtain the information shown in Table 1 , which will be the input for the verification of our model. More information on this case study and the high variability on the data can be found in Morant et al. 8 The waiting time that starts with a detected signalling failure (where the driver has to stop and the operation is not possible until the driver is allowed to continue the operation at reduced speed in a degraded mode) is not recorded in any database. However, this time is relevant since it is the time when railway operation is not possible. With the support of the Trafikverket personnel, it was deduced that these waiting times range from a few seconds, until half an hour, depending on the severity of the failure. For the evaluation performed in this paper, an average of 5 min was taken, which was the recommendation from the experts.
Model development for safety and availability evaluation of railway operation
The model developed in this paper is based on the fusion of different types of information obtained from corrective maintenance data records, operational data and railway architecture. The model studies the effect of a failure in the signalling SoS on the overall railway operation in terms of safety and availability. Previous research related to the railway signalling systems provided current theories and suggested ways to improve the dependability of signalling systems, while Trafikverket documentation and unstructured interviews with experts facilitated the understanding of the information and results.
The collected data and information are processed and combined for the analyses, with Excel 2010, Matlab 2014a and the R software (version 3.0.0) used for data processing, model development and verification. The model is based on a Markov process with discrete states and continuous time and is used to calculate the probability of the different operational states (safe operation, not operative or operative in degraded modes) of a TS, identifying the systems that most affect a safe operation of the railway. Depending on which system that is affected by the failure and the operational status of the railway, the model considers different operational states. Various scenarios are considered to verify the model, including mean values, worst-and best-case scenarios, simulation of effects of an improvement in reliability and maintainability, etc. Finally, the results are combined to show the effects of the signalling SoS on the railway operation of the considered RC.
Looking at the signalling systems as a SoS is interesting when studying the effect on the safe operation of every subsystem and when calculating the probability of being in the various operative states on a specific TS and for the RC as a whole. The railway operation can be considered to be in one of three possible states depending on whether operation is possible and whether the signalling system is operative. The three states can be summarised as follows:
1. Operative state: In this state, operation is possible and the signalling system is fully operative. 2. Faulty state: This is the operational state from when the failure occurs and the operation is stopped until the dispatcher allows continued operation in a degraded mode (40 km/h, driver responsible for supervision and protection). 3. Degraded state: In this state, the railway operation is possible in a degraded mode (40 km/h, driver responsible for supervision and protection), but the signalling system is not operative due to a failure in one of the signalling subsystems.
Depending on the subsystem affected by the failure, the three operational states of the railway infrastructure considered are subdivided, giving a total of 11 states that determine the different operational states and the state of the signalling SoS (indicating which is the system failed). The states are described in Table 2 . The last two columns of the table show graphically the status of safety and availability, and how these change depending on the state of the railway: with a 'þþ'OK, 'À' when operating in a degraded mode and '-' when the signalling system is not ensuring safety or the railway is not available. 
Markov theory
Various authors have evaluated the availability and/ or safety of railway signalling systems: Markov Chains, 21 Monte Carlo Simulation 22 and Stochastic Petri Nets 23, 24 are suitable approaches for stochastic modelling to evaluate the RAMS of a railway signalling system. RAMS problems are normally concerned with systems that are discrete in space, i.e. they can exist in one of a number of discrete and identifiable states and are continuous in time; i.e. they exist continuously in one of the system states until a transition takes them discretely to another state, in which they then exist continuously until another transition occurs. 25 In the Swedish railway, previous research has shown the low accuracy of the corrective maintenance records regarding railway signalling systems. 8 While hidden Markov models, semi-Markov models and Petri nets would include in the evaluation the failures on redundant systems or components, and the ageing of the system, this would require having further assumptions since some of the information needed is not possible to obtain. This paper considers the failure rate of a specific time to evaluate the performance of the railway signalling systems and to support maintenance decisions.
The Markov approach is applicable when handling both repairable and non-repairable systems, under the following assumptions: 25 1. The behaviour of the system must be characterised by a lack of memory; that is the future states of a system are independent of all past states except the immediately preceding one
2. The process must be stationary (i.e. the probability of making a transition from one given state to another is the same at all times in the past and future). 3. Finally, it must be possible to define the different states of the system.
The transition rates from one state into another can be defined as in equation (2), 25 and the transition between the different states of the Markov model is given by the failure, restoration and waiting rates (l, m o and m w , respectively) of each considered system. The transition rates describe not only the reliability of the process and the design of the components but also the effectiveness of operation and maintenance practices 26 shown as Transition rate ¼ number of times a transition occurs from a given state time spent in the given state
With respect to the transition rate, three time parameters can be defined. The mean operating time between failures (MTBF) is the expectation of the operating time between failures and can be calculated following equation (3), being Át the time of observation and k F the total number of failure of the items during the time of observation; the mean time to maintain (MTTM) is the expectation of the time to restore (see equation (4)), and the mean waiting time is the time from the start of the downtime until the driver is allowed by the dispatcher to continue operation in a degraded operating mode
From equation (2), the transition between the different states of the Markov model is given by l, m o and m w of each system considered (see equations (5) to (7)). In particular, m w measures the rate of systems staying in the non-operative state
The probability of being in the operating state after an incremental interval of time dt (made sufficiently small so that the probability of two or more events occurring during this increment of time is negligible) is [Prob. of being operative at time t AND not failing in time dt] þ [probability of being failed at time t AND of being repaired in time dt]. 25 For example, for a continuous Markov process with two system states 1 and 2, as shown in equation (8) , the equation obtained is a linear differential equation with constant coefficients, which can be solved by Laplace transforms
Since the probability of occurrence of a transition in this interval of time Át is equal to the transition rate times the time interval, the stochastic transitional probability matrix for a continuous Markov process with two states can be expressed as follows
If represents the limiting probability vector of being in the different states, and P is the stochastic transitional probability matrix, once the limiting state probabilities have been reached by the matrix multiplication method, and any further multiplication by the stochastic transitional probability matrix does not change the values of the limiting state probabilities, 25 then
and
Rearranging equations (10) and (11) allows the use of the stochastic transitional probability matrix simplified by omitting the Át terms
Model development
The state-space diagram for the Markov process visualised in Figure 2 shows the different states of the system (see Table 1 for description) and the possible transitions between them. The stochastic transitional probability matrix (P) shows the probability of going from one state to another (the probability of going from state i to state j is equal to P i,j ). The possibility of going from a failed state to the operative state (e.g. from the state 2 to the state 1) is not considered possible, since the inspection of the failure and the restoration action are performed in the third state (when the railway operation is possible in a degraded mode). It is possible to deduce then the simplified stochastic transitional probability matrix from equation (12) The system is considered to be fully operative for the initial state expressed as 
Framework for safety and availability evaluation of the railway operation
The different probability states for a TS can be obtained by the sum of the various probabilities for the faulty and degraded states, respectively (see equations (13) and (14)), since it can be assumed that it is only possible to have one failure on a TS at a specific moment in time. The sum of all the probabilities must be equal to 1, since the operational state is unique in every instant of time (see equation (15))
The availability of the whole RC can be represented by the probabilities of the different operational states; therefore, the probability of achieving the expected requirements in terms of punctuality and availability. The probability of all the TSs that comprise the RC being fully operative can be calculated knowing that the probability of failure for each TS is independent of the others. For the operative state, the only case for this probability is that all the TS are in this state (see equation (16) , while the probability of being in a faulty state will be given by the probability that at least one TS is in that state (see equation (17)). Finally, the probability of being in a degraded operational mode state will be given by the probability of not being on the operative or faulty states (equation (18))
However, for the purpose of this paper, the different probabilities are calculated assuming the same probabilities for all TSs (otherwise, a Markov model must be performed for each TS).
Analysed scenarios and results
This paper analyses the performance of the signalling SoS on TS level based on the collected data. Eight scenarios are considered and described in Table 3 . These scenarios show the probabilities of being in the different operational states obtained by the mean failure and restoration rates and enable a study of the effects of the availability of railway signalling systems and the effects of implementing different maintenance policies.
The considered scenarios can be divided in two types. In the first type, scenarios F-1 to F-5 are based on real data gathered from the maintenance databases, from which the MTBF and MTTM have been obtained for the different TSs that compose the RC of the case study. In the second type, scenarios S-1 to S-3 are based on the recorded data, but they simulate the impact on the safety and availability of the railway operation of different maintenance policies for the signalling SoS. Scenario F-1 represents the mean values obtained from the corrective maintenance data for the TSs on the studied RC. Scenarios F-2 and F-3 allow studying the effect of the different RAMS variables (such as the MTBF and the MTTM) on the railway operation to see which has more influence on safe operation. Scenarios F-4 and F-5 allow to look at the variance between the probability states obtained for the worst-case scenario and the best-case scenario observed from the recordings for all TSs on the RC, looking at the range of values for the MTBF and MTTM (i.e. the lowest reliability and highest maintainability).
Finally, scenarios S-1, S-2 and S-3 simulate the probabilities obtained when improving the reliability of the SoS (increasing MTBF in scenario S-1 by 50%), combining an improvement in reliability and maintainability simultaneously (increasing MTBF by 25% and decreasing MTTM by 25% in scenario S-2), or improving the maintainability (reducing MTTM by 50% in scenario S-3). By studying these scenarios (S-1 to S-3), it is possible to identify the effects of different maintenance policies on the safety and availability of the railway operation.
Results obtained for the scenarios F-1 to F-5 Tables 4 to 7 show the relative probabilities between states. For the operative state, it is desirable to achieve a probability state that is as high as possible, but for faulty and degraded states, the lowest one will give the best results for safety and availability. Table 4 shows the probabilities of being in the different states for scenarios F-1 to F-5. Figure 3 shows graphically the state probabilities. This allows comparing the results, looking at the performance variance in a real TS. Figure 3 shows a difference between the values obtained for the state probabilities for the various scenarios. For example, for the LC, the state probability of being in a degraded state obtained for scenario F-4 is 14 times the one obtained for the F-5 scenario. This difference is also remarkable for the BG (11 times). The differences are minor for faulty states, even though they remain identifiable: six times for the faulty state linked to the LC and five times for the one linked to the BG.
There is also a difference between the probabilities of the different scenarios of the system most affecting the railway operation. For example, for scenarios F-1 and F-2, the maximum probability of being in a faulty state is linked to a failure of the TC, and the maximum probability of being in a degraded state is Simulation with a 25% reduction of the MTBF and 25% reduction on the MTTM S-3
Simulation with a 50% reduction of the MTTM and mean values of the MTBF linked to a failure of a signal. For scenarios F-3 and F-4, the maximum probabilities for both the faulty state and the degraded state are related to the LC. For scenario F-5, the maximum probability of being in a faulty state is related to the TC and to the IXL for a degraded state. The smallest difference between the state probabilities occurs for the LC and the TC in scenario F-5, where the probability of being in a degraded state is two times higher than the probability of being in a faulty state. The maximum difference is obtained for the BG in scenario F-4, with a probability of being in a degraded state that is 11 times higher than the probability of not being operative.
Results obtained for the scenarios F-1 and S-1 to S-3 Table 5 shows the probabilities of being in different states for scenarios F-1 and S-1 to S-3. The corresponding values are visualised in Figure 4 , where the recorded mean values and the possible effects of different maintenance policies on safety and availability of a TS can be compared.
The highest probability of being in an operational state is obtained for scenario S-2. The probability of being in a degraded state is 1.5 times higher for scenario S-1 and S-3 than for scenario F-1. For scenario S-2 this difference is increased to 1.7 times higher than for scenario F-1. Scenario S-3 and scenario F-1 have the same values for the faulty states. However, it is possible to see an improvement in scenarios S-1 (1.5 times the values obtained for F-1) and S-2 (1.7 times the values obtained for F-1). The reduction is less for the operational states; here, the improvement in reliability is only 25% instead of 50% as in scenario S-1, and there is no improvement for scenario S-3. Results obtained for the TS and RC Table 6 shows the summarised results for the probabilities of a TS being in one of the three operational states, independent of the failed system. The probability of being in a faulty state is four times higher in scenario F-4 than in scenario F-5, and the variance of the probability of being in a degraded state is up to eight times higher.
The results for the simulations of different maintenance policies are similar to the results obtained in section 5.2. The highest increase of the probability of being operational is obtained for scenario S-2, which also has the highest reduction in the probability of being in a degraded state. However, the maximum reduction for the faulty state occurs in scenario S-1.
Finally, Table 7 shows the results of the state probabilities obtained for the whole RC. This is where the effects of a failure on the railway operation can be observed, since it not only considers the failure of the systems found on a TS, but also the number of TSs a train drives through when going from one location to another.
For the considered RC, the percentage of probability of a train having all TSs operative is between 76 and 96%. With the different simulations of the maintenance policies, the probability of being in an operational state could be improved by reducing the probability of being in a degraded state (in the case of S-3) or by reducing the probabilities of being in both faulty and degraded states (S-1 and S-2). Again, the maximum improvement on the operation is given in scenario S-2 where there is an improvement of both the failure and repair rate, while the highest reduction in the probability of being in a faulty state is obtained for scenario S-1.
Discussion
Since this research is based on the corrective maintenance affecting operation (supervision, protection, control, information) recorded in the database 0felia, it does not take into account corrective maintenance that could have been done but not recorded, e.g. during inspections. The use of real maintenance data makes the research process more complex, but renders the results more relevant since they reflect the complexity of reality. To increase the quality of the maintenance records (e.g. recording the component affected, reducing the 'not defined' failure modes or recording if the failure affects the railway operation) would increase the reliability of the obtained results.
A Markov model is developed to calculate the probability of the three operational states (operative, faulty or degraded) of a TS, identifying the systems that most affect the safe operation of the railway. The model was used to evaluate the operational effects of dependability improvements of different signalling assets and then verified with a case study of a Swedish railway signalling system using a number of scenarios. The Markov model is a tool for maintainers to use when evaluating the safety and availability of the railway operation by analysing the times when operation is possible but the signalling system is not ensuring safety; it also allows simulating the effects of different RAMS improvements. Its simplicity allows using the actual maintenance records to obtain an estimation of the level of safety and availability, despite the lack of detailed data (which would be needed if implementing a more complex model). Further work can be oriented to investigate better models that can give a better estimation of the probabilities, by taking into account the failure and repair distributions.
Depending on the performance of the signalling system, new actions can be taken to achieve improvements, and the model can simulate the effects of these on both safety and availability, not only with regard to potential delays or cancellations, but also considering safe operation and the reduction of the probability of operation in a degraded state.
The probability of being in a state where operation is possible in a degraded mode is higher than the probability of not being operative at all. Operating the railway in a degraded state can reduce the delays caused by a failure of the signalling system, but this does not change the fact that the signalling system is failed and, hence, safety cannot be ensured. In order to evaluate the safety and availability of the railway, we must not only look into reliability and maintainability (i.e. considering failures and delays) but also consider the probability of operation in a degraded mode. From a safety perspective, the better option is signalling system with lower reliability but a safer design than one with higher reliability but with a higher probability of operating in a degraded mode.
The differences in the results obtained for scenarios F-1 to F-5 can be linked to the fact that these results are obtained from operational instead of inherent reliability and maintainability data. Hence, other factors related to the environment, operation, etc. can influence the behaviour of the systems. The logistics related to the waiting time for performing corrective maintenance in a certain location also play an important role in the real repair rates. Maintenance improvements can be oriented, for example, to reduce the waiting time related to logistics if it is necessary to reduce the degraded operational mode.
The probabilities of being in a faulty state are the same for scenarios S-3 and F-1 because the increased probability of being operative is based on a reduction in the repair rate that only affects the degraded states. The probability of being in a faulty state is reduced for scenarios S-1 and S-2 because the improvement is based on a global reduction of the failure rate, which affects all the states. The highest improvement in operational time is obtained for scenario S-2 by combining measures to reduce both the repair and the failure rate, which also gives the highest reduction in the probability of being in a degraded state.
A reduction of MTTM can be obtained by improving the maintainability or the maintenance support performance (e.g. reducing the logistics time, optimising maintenance time by increasing personnel expertise, etc.). A reduction of the MTBF can be obtained by improving the inherent reliability of the systems by reducing the external factors, reducing the number of assets needed for a TS, implementing condition-based maintenance methods for failure diagnostics and prognostics and/or improving the preventive maintenance, etc. Another important consideration when looking for the best maintenance strategy is the cost associated with each improvement; of course, this will depend on the specific situation. The best maintenance policy is reached when the minimum requirements of safety are met. If this is already optimum, the best option is to improve the probability of the operational state.
This paper has used the 50, 25 and 75% quartiles to show the range of variation that can be obtained when implementing the model, depending on the input data. The choice of these values is more for the purpose of easy visibility than anything else. The results of other simulations using the median, absolute maximums and minimums, and 5 and 10% quartiles show no relevant differences.
Conclusions
This paper proposes a framework to evaluate the safety and availability of railway operation, by quantifying the probability of the signalling system not to supervise the railway traffic. The following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The proposed methodology is successful on evaluating the safety and availability of the railway operation, focusing on railway signalling systems. 2. The results obtained from the model show that the probability of being in a state where operation is possible in a degraded mode is greater than the probability of not being operative at all, which reduces delays, but requires other risk mitigation measures to ensure safe operation. 3. Operational and environmental factors may have a great influence on the safety of the railway operation. Further work can be oriented to identify and measure the effects of external factors that can affect the performance of railway signalling systems. 4. Combining maintenance improvements to reduce the failure rate and increase the repair rate is more efficient at increasing the probability of being in an operative state and reducing the probability of operating in a degraded state than to only reducing the failure rate or increasing the repair rate.
Even though this research has used the case study of the Swedish signalling system to verify the model, it can be generalised to other types of signalling systems or railway networks. Further research can be focused on the application of this method to evaluate and compare the performance of the signalling SoS from different locations, architectures or design solutions, thereby assisting in the decision-making process when improving or updating the railway infrastructure.
